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Abstract
Federalism has become increasingly used as a tool of conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. This contribution discusses
the rationale in using federalism as a tool of peace-building, conflict resolution and democratisation in deeply divided,
ethnically heterogeneous and post-conflict societies. In doing so, it is highlighted how federalism can serve as an acceptable
and viable solution for different ethnic groups because of its emphasis on autonomy and territorial integrity. The contribution
also demonstrates that federalism is not able to solve all problems in ethnically heterogeneous societies and that further
research is needed in order to understand the conditions in which federalism can be used to end conflict and bring peace
and democracy to divided countries.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increased use in federalism as a tool of conflict resolution. In recent years,
the nature of conflict has changed, as evidenced by the proliferation of civil wars and conflicts rooted in ethnic, religious and
linguistic diversity (Kaldor 2012). These ‘new wars’ have thus necessitated the development of new tools for managing and
resolving ethnocultural conflicts. Federalism is one such tool, able to satisfy the aspirations and demands of both minority
and majority groups: giving minority groups (limited) control over their own economic, political and social affairs, while also
sustaining  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  extant  state.  As  most  violent  conflicts  are  intrastate  conflicts  —  fought  between
different groups within one country (rather than between different countries) —  the potential of federalism to facilitate the
accommodation of differences, protect minority groups, prevent territorial disintegration and maintain political stability, has
rendered it one of the international community’s preferred conflict ameliorating strategies (Monteux, 2006: 164).
This  paper  will  outline  why  federalism  has  become  an  important  tool  of  conflict  resolution.  We  will  begin  by  defining
federalism and giving a brief overview of the rationale behind its use in post-conflict societies. Second, we will  draw upon
some concrete examples to illustrate the prominence of federalism in bringing peace and stability to war-torn countries. In
the penultimate section, we will examine some of the limitations of approaching federalism as a tool of conflict resolution.
The conclusion will demonstrate that further empirical and theoretical research is needed in order to fully understand the
conditions in which federalism can contribute to peace-building and conflict resolution.
Conceptual Clarification
Federalism, in the words of Ronald Watts (2008: 8) ‘refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered
government combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule’. Watts, in the same vein as Preston King (1982) and
Michael  Burgess  (2006),  interprets  federalism  as  a  normative  term,  a  philosophical  and  ideological  principle  to  be
differentiated  from  federation  which  denotes  the  ‘tangible  institutional  reality’  of  a  federal  state  (Burgess,  2006:  285).
Moreover, Watts, following Daniel Elazar (1987), places emphasis on both the shared and self-rule elements of federations.
Self-rule refers to the (territorial) autonomy granted to the regions, Länder, states, provinces or cantons. Shared-rule, on the
other  hand,  denotes  the  ability  of  the  sub-national  governments  to  participate  in,  influence  and  make  decisions  at  the
centre.
The rationale behind federalism is manifold. According to William Livingston (1956: 1), ‘federalism, like most institutional
forms, is a solution of, or an attempt to solve, a certain kind of problem of political organization’. In some states, federalism
is chosen as an instrument of good governance, an organising principle where sovereign polities rescind some of their
sovereignty in order to pool resources and become part of a larger network. These countries, predominantly mononational
states such as Australia, Germany and the USA, are, according to Alfred Stepan (1999), ‘coming together’ federations. The
second category of federations put forward by Stepan is ‘holding together’ federations; the heading under which most
plurinational states fall, including, inter alia, Belgium, Ethiopia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Nepal. This category also includes states
that have used elements of federalism such as the provision of autonomy in order to manage pre-existing diversity (such as
Spain and the United Kingdom). It is these ‘holding together’ federations, which often face ethnic conflict (and in some cases
violence) and hence employ federalism as a tool of conflict resolution.
Nancy  Bermeo  (2002)  writes  of  the  ‘peace  preserving’  characteristics  of  federalism,  underlining  that  it  isolates  conflicts,
peacefully accommodates minority groups and ensures a democratic response to ethnocultural tensions. In the absence of
such democratic institutions, the alternatives would be either inhumane responses such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, or
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secession,  partition  or  further  conflict,  and  as  McGarry  and  O’Leary  (2009)  point  out,  these  options  serve  only  to  further
worsen ethnic tensions.
As  Hannum (2004:  395)  points  out,  federalism  is  often  considered  the  optimal  choice  in  heterogeneous  and  post-conflict
societies because it appeases both the majority and minority community. The self-rule and shared rule aspects of federalism
ensure that sub-national groups have significant, and in some cases extensive, sovereign control over specific policy areas,
such as language and education policy, while also ensuring that such groups are, through the shared rule mechanisms, able
to  influence  and  participate  in  the  decision  making  processes  at  the  centre.  For  the  central  government,  the
institutionalisation of a federal system can help curtail the secessionist demands of regional separatists. Modern history is
testament to the growing challenge of  secessionism in modern politics,  yet the use of  federalism, while it  has been
unsuccessful  in  completely  removing  secessionist  challenges  from plurinational  states,  has  succeeded  in  preventing
territorial  disintegration.  In  short,  the  ability  of  federalism  to  divide  power  among  different  people  while  sustaining  the
external borders of the extant state make it an attractive tool of conflict resolution.
Case Studies
In the post-Cold War era, a number of countries have adopted federal features in their constitutional frameworks in order to
deal with diversity and the resulting conflicts. These include Belgium (1993), Russia (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995),
Ethiopia (1995), South Africa (1996), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001), Iraq (2005) and Nepal (2015),
amongst others. Furthermore, ongoing debates about federalism, decentralization and the provision of territorial autonomy
for certain ethnic groups in countries as diverse as Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar and Libya highlight the contemporary relevance
of the federal idea. While not all of these countries have faced violent conflict, what they all have in common is deep-rooted
diversity, i.e. the existence of multiple ethnic groups on the territory of the state, and a resulting need to manage this
diversity that goes beyond the traditional model of liberal democracy. Hence, federalism as an idea that ensures self-rule
(i.e.  autonomy for  territorially  concentrated ethnic  groups)  and shared-rule  (the inclusion of  different  ethnic  groups in  the
decision-making processes of the country) has featured prominently as a mechanism of diversity management. What is
more, the provision of autonomy has been a key demand of groups that have previously fought for independence and
secession, such as the Serbs in Bosnia, the Albanians in Macedonia or the Chin and Karen in Myanmar.
In some of these countries international actors (such as the UN, NATO or the EU) have played an important role in the
introduction of federal institutional mechanisms. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been described as a country in
which federalism has been “imposed” (Keil 2013), while Iraq, too can be considered as a case in which international actors
provided important input into the federal debate (Danilovich 2014). Likewise, as a result of international involvement, the
arrangements for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003) and Sudan (2005) included secession provisions which
delineated  institutional  procedures,  including  a  specific  time  limit,  for  the  constituent  parts  of  the  states  to  become
independent.
Various countries around the world have used federalism or elements of decentralisation in order to deal with ethnic
conflicts. In some of these countries, the use of federalism has contributed to peace-building and brought an end to violent
conflict (for example in Bosnia, South Africa, Macedonia and Nepal). In other cases, federalism has been less successful. The
ongoing violence and increased competition among ethnic groups over territory and natural resources in Ethiopia, Nigeria
and  Iraq  have  intensified  because  of  the  introduction  of  decentralised  structures  that  have  resulted  in  new  distribution
conflicts  (Erk,  2014:  546).  Some  federal  arrangements  have  included  secession  clauses,  such  as  in  Sudan  and  Serbia-
Montenegro. While not always a success, what ongoing debates about federalism in post-conflict societies highlight, is the
strong link between the introduction of democratic governance and the potential  to overcome legacies of large scale
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violence. The current debate in Myanmar, which resulted in a peace agreement and a commitment to the introduction of
federalism in August 2016, demonstrates this point.
The Limits of Federalism
It is an illusion to assume that federalism will be able to solve all problems in deeply divided societies, especially those that
have  endured  violent  ethnic  conflict.  Challenges  to  territorial  integrity  and  calls  for  secession  will  not  disappear  despite
commitments to federalism, as demonstrated in well-established democracies such as Canada,  Spain and the United
Kingdom as well as in new federations in post-conflict societies, including Bosnia, Ethiopia and Iraq. This is because in post-
conflict  countries  mutual  trust,  willingness  to  cooperate  and  the  political  motivation  for  compromise  are  relatively  low
amongst  political  elites  representing different  ethnic  groups.  As  Burgess  (2012)  has  argued,  the key to  successful  federal
democracy in these countries lie in the evolution of a federal political culture. In addition, notwithstanding the commitment
of federalism to deepening democratic procedures in divided societies, the consolidation of democracy has been difficult to
achieve.  Bosnia and Iraq are examples where federal  power-sharing has been implemented,  but the consolidation of
democracy has hitherto been unsuccessful. Furthermore, post-war societies face additional reform needs in order to deal
with  the  results  of  long-term  conflict.  These  include  dealing  with  reconciliation,  economic  reconstruction,  refugee  return,
demilitarisation and societal reintegration. Finally, what has become evident in recent years is that in order for federal,
democratic structures to take root and function in deeply divided post-conflict states, these institutional arrangements need
to  be  flexible  and  be  able  to  adapt  to  shifting  policy  demands  and  preferences  amongst  the  different  groups.  The
abovementioned time limits in Sudan and Serbia-Montenegro regarding secession, as well as asymmetrical arrangements in
Iraq  and  Bosnia,  to  name only  two,  can  be  seen  as  examples  of  this  need  for  inbuilt  flexibility.  Contemporary  debates  in
Libya, Syria and Ukraine underline this need for flexible solutions in a world of ever more complex conflict; there can be no
‘one size fits all’ approach to federalism in post-conflict societies.
Conclusion
The contemporary debates on federalism as a tool of conflict resolution have ensued from the changing pattern of conflict in
the post-Cold War era. The modern world is composed of a medley of ethnoculturally diverse states and the need for
recognition and inclusion of the ineradicable fact of diversity has become ever more prevalent. The ability of federalism to
satisfy,  at  least  to some extent,  the demands of  both minority  and majority  groups has increased the popularity  of
federalism as  a  method to  manage diversity  and competing nation-building projects  within  a  democratic  framework.
Federalism  has  become  increasingly  more  important  in  resolving  violent  conflicts,  contributing  to  peace  building  and
promoting democratic  governance.  However,  as we have seen,  federalism is  not  a panacea to the many intractable
challenges that deeply divided, ethnically heterogeneous and post-conflict countries encounter. As federalism becomes an
ever-more prominent tool of conflict resolution, it is imperative to enhance the extant theoretical and empirical research on
the contemporary federal idea. The proliferation of these new federal models to deal with the complex challenges of the
twenty first century, underlines the need for originality and flexibility in our approach to conflict resolution.
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